{"id":196,"date":"2025-06-21T18:42:00","date_gmt":"2025-06-21T18:42:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/?p=196"},"modified":"2025-12-28T19:54:55","modified_gmt":"2025-12-28T19:54:55","slug":"forest-hackthebox-lab","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/?p=196","title":{"rendered":"Forest- Hackthebox lab"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

icked off the assessment with a thorough Nmap scan to discover open ports and fingerprint the services running on the Forest host.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

After identifying RPC on 135, I used rpcclient<\/code> to connect anonymously and enumerate every domain user.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

I compiled the discovered usernames into a file and ran Impacket\u2019s GetNPUsers.py<\/strong> to test which accounts were vulnerable to AS-REP roasting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The AS-REP hash for the svc-alfresco<\/strong> account was extracted and successfully cracked offline with Hashcat<\/strong>, revealing its clear-text password.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

With valid credentials obtained, I established an Evil-WinRM<\/strong> session to gain an interactive shell on the target.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Once on the box, I browsed to the user\u2019s desktop and captured the first flag\u2014user.txt<\/code>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

BloodHound revealed that our compromised account already belongs to the Account Operators<\/strong> group, giving it elevated control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Because Account Operators holds GenericAll<\/strong> rights over the Exchange server object, it also controls the Exchange Windows Permissions<\/strong> group. Through my Evil-WinRM session, I created a new domain user named scoobydoo<\/strong> and added it to the Exchange Windows Permissions<\/strong> group.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Next, I leveraged DCSync.py<\/code> to grant scoobydoo<\/strong> the ability to replicate directory changes (DCSync) from the domain controller.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

I then performed a DCSync attack with Impacket\u2019s secretsdump.py<\/code>, dumping the NTLM hashes for all privileged accounts\u2014including the domain administrator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Using the administrator hash, I launched psexec.py<\/code> to obtain a SYSTEM shell on the domain controller.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

With full administrative access, I navigated to the Administrator\u2019s desktop and secured the final flag\u2014root.txt<\/code>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Ultimately, the Forest machine fell to a classic Active Directory escalation chain: AS-REP roasting a weak service account, abusing the inherited rights of the Account Operators group to manipulate Exchange permissions, granting DCSync privileges, and dumping NTDS secrets to obtain the Administrator hash for full SYSTEM compromise. This walkthrough underscores how a single weak Kerberos account and legacy group privileges can cascade into complete domain takeover\u2014reminding defenders to enforce strong service-account passwords, restrict privileged groups, and harden Exchange delegation settings.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

icked off the assessment with a thorough Nmap scan to discover open ports and fingerprint the services running on the Forest host. After identifying RPC on 135, I used rpcclient to connect anonymously and enumerate every domain user. I compiled the discovered usernames into a file and ran Impacket\u2019s GetNPUsers.py […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":197,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-196","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-cybersecurity","category-pentesting"],"brizy_media":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/196","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=196"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/196\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":537,"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/196\/revisions\/537"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/197"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=196"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=196"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thecyberstaff.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=196"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}